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manufacturing plants. The model’s predictions are moderately supported. 
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The Japanese labor market has witnessed a rapid increase in numbers of temporary workers
since the 1990s. Although this trend prevails in most sectors, the shift from permanent to
temporary workers has been greater among Japan’s manufactures. For example, the propor-
tion of temporary workers among the total manufacturing workforce (the non-permanent
ratio) increased from 23.6% in 2001 to 29.4% in 2006, but it increased from 35.2% to 39.0%
among all industries during that period. Moreover, the number of permanent employees
in Japanese manufacturing fell by approximately 1 million, but the total number of man-
ufacturing employees fell by only 570,000, since the number of dispatched workers and
subcontractors rose by 400,000. Approximately 40% of the permanent employees who left
manufacturing jobs have been replaced by dispatched workers and subcontractors.1
Why are Japanese manufactures aggressively employing more temporary workers? A
plausible culprit is the recent deregulation. The Japanese government has relaxed reg-
ulations concerning temporary jobs since the late 1990’s. Its hallmark was the Worker
Dispatching Act in 2004, which reduce restrictions hampering temporary job agencies from
dispatching workers to the manufacturers. We acknowledge that deregulation may have
inﬂuenced the shift from permanent to temporary workers in manufacturing. However, the
shift began long before the late 1990’s. In addition, it is said that the pressure of glob-
alization has made Japanese companies more attentive to workforce ﬂexibility and more
sensitive to employment costs.2 Thus, it is natural to ask to what extent the documented
shift in the workforce is attributable to economic globalization. Few rigorous analyses have
sought to verify this causal relationship, and that is our goal.
This paper formalizes the idea that global competition may encourage manufactures to
shift from permanent to temporary workers. We test hypotheses derived from our theo-
retical framework using Japanese plant-level micro-data. For this purpose, we extend the
1The authors’ calculation is based on the Establishment and Enterprise Census.
2In 2004, Nippon Keidanren, Japan’s largest lobbying group composed of 1,281 companies and 129 in-
dustrial associations, published a report on employment and personnel management. The report claims that
labor market ﬂexibility and more aggressive use of temporary workers are vital for ﬁrms because of increasing
market uncertainty and sales volatility caused stemming from incrementally tough global competition. The
report is available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/041/honbun.html#s1.
1framework of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous ﬁrms in Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) by introducing ﬁrms’ choices between a workforce composed of permanent and tem-
porary workers (Saint-Paul (1997) and others).
The monopolistic competition model proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) suits our
purpose because international trade intensiﬁes competition forcing ﬁrms to cut proﬁt mar-
gins. In the “dual” labor market model of Saint-Paul (1997), ﬁrms optimize their demand
for permanent workers, who entail ﬁring costs, and non-permanent (temporary) workers
who entail no ﬁring costs. A basic intuition of this framework is that ﬁrms use temporary
workers to buﬀer revenue ﬂuctuations and their employment of permanent workers depends
on their true cost, that is, the wage plus the expected ﬁring costs.
Our basic idea is as follows. Firms prefer less volatile revenue ﬂuctuations because
they expect to save ﬁring costs. Firms become more proﬁtable if they reduce revenue ﬂuc-
tuations. In the model, ﬁrms attempt to reduce revenue ﬂuctuations by increasing the
number of products, assuming that revenue ﬂuctuations of each product line are uncorre-
lated. However, it is reasonable to presume that it is more diﬃcult to manage a larger
number of products. The ﬁrm optimally chooses the scope of its products as the recently
increasing multi-product literature suggests (Eckel and Neary (2010), Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (2006), Nocke and Yeaple (2006), and Baldwin and Gu (2006)). In particular, as
Nocke and Yeaple (2006), the management capabilities of ﬁrms are heterogenous. Thus,
the number of products is heterogenous. Firms with more products more eﬀectively smooth
revenue ﬂuctuations than ﬁrms with few products, resulting in cost diversiﬁcation across
ﬁrms for hiring permanent workers. Greater openness in international trade reduces each
product’s proﬁtability. Thus, ﬁrms are forced to concentrate on fewer products which am-
pliﬁes revenue ﬂuctuations. Thus, ﬁrms refrain from hiring permanent workers and prefer
temporary workers.
We can derive the following predictions from our model. First, lager ﬁrms tend to
have more products and lower shares of temporary workers in their workforce than small
ﬁrms. Second, employment among ﬁrms with fewer products (small ﬁrms) is more volatile
than that among ﬁrms with more products (large ﬁrms). Third, given that ﬁrms use both
2permanent workers and temporary workers, ﬁrms increase total employment by hiring more
temporary workers. When total employment increases, the share of temporary workers
rises. Finally, when trade costs decline, the share of export sales among total sales rises,
and the share of temporary workers comprising labor input rises.
We can observe one of model’s predictions in industry-level data. Figure 1 is a scatter
chart in which changes in the non-permanent ratio from 2001 to 2006 and the export to
production ratio as of 2001 are plotted for each industry in the manufacturing sector. From
this, we can observe that industries more reliant on exports in 2001 more aggressively
replaced with permanent employees with temporary workers in the years following.
We test these predictions empirically, using plant-level data from the Census of Manu-
facturing. Our data set covers all manufacturers with four or more employees in 2001-2007.
After scrutinizing the data, we ﬁnd that the evidence moderately supports our model’s
predictions. First, there is a signiﬁcant negative correlation between plant size and the
temporary worker ratio: in 2001, the temporary worker ratio was is 10.6% for plants with
1000 or more employees and 18.6% for plants with fewer than 100. Second, the average num-
ber of products per plant shows a clear positive correlation with plant size. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that small plants face high volatility in sales. Finally, we ﬁnd revenue volatility
signiﬁcantly boost the ratio of temporary workers. The model predicts that ﬁrms with
large changes in the ratio of export sales to total sales also show greater changes in the
ratio of temporary workers to all workers. Unfortunately, the data only partially support
this prediction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoret-
ical framework and derives empirically testable hypotheses. Section 3 tests the model’s
predictions and Section 4 presents the conclusion.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple model of dynamic adjustment in which risk-neutral ﬁrms
can employ both permanent workers with adjustment costs and temporary workers without
adjustment costs. The model allows us to derive empirically testable predictions about how
3international trade aﬀects demand for temporary workers relative to permanent workers.
The model is a three-period version of the dynamic labor adjustment model of Saint-Paul
(1997) and others. We extend the model by allowing ﬁrms to hold multi products and by
putting it in the monopolistic competition trade framework of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy populated with L households, each of which inelastically supplies one
units of labor. The representative consumer maximizes the following quasi-linear utility
function based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002):
















where q0 and q(ω) denote individual consumption of the numeraire good and each variety
ω of diﬀerentiated goods, respectively. N is the measure of the consumed varieties of
diﬀerentiated goods. Parameters α,ζ, and η are non-negative. Parameter α and η denote
the consumer’s maximum willingness-to-pay for the diﬀerentiated goods: increases in α
and decreases in η shift demand from the numeraire good to the diﬀerentiated goods. The
parameter ζ indexes the degree of product diﬀerentiation between the varieties: when ζ = 0,
the varieties are perfect substitute. The inverse demand for each variety ω for the individual
consumer is given by
p(ω) = α − ζq(ω) − ηQ, (2)
where Q =
R N
0 q(ω)dω. By summing (2) for all varieties and deriving the expression for Q,













where ¯ p = (1/N)
R
p(ω)dω is their average price.
We introduce uncertainty about demand for each variety and assume that the upper
boundary of price, pmax, beyond which demand for a variety goes to zero, has an error term
µ such that
pmax =
ζα + ηN¯ p
ηN + ζ
+ µ, (4)
4where the µ is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and follows a normal distri-
bution with mean 0 and variance σ2. Hence, denoting the upper boundary price pmax by
z, z has the mean of ¯ z = (ηN ¯ p + αζ)/(ηN + ζ) and the variance σ2. The price elasticity
of demand ￿ω = |(∂q(ω)/∂p(ω))(p(ω)/q(ω))| = [(pmax/p(ω))−1]−1 on average. An increase
in the number of competing varieties N or a reduction of average prices ¯ p raises ￿ω (a
“tougher” competitive environment).
2.2 Sequences of Events
Before proceeding to ﬁrms’ labor demand, it is useful to establish sequences of events (see
Figure 2). At period 0 (t = 0), ﬁrms randomly draw their management skill φ from a
common distribution H(φ). After knowing the management skill level of φ, each ﬁrm
determines its number of products, n. There is no production in period 0, and each ﬁrm
employs no labor. At the end of period 0, the market size for period 1 (t = 1), z1, is
revealed. Each ﬁrm determines its total labor inputs and how many permanent workers it
employs among them. Production occurs in period 1 at the end of which the market size in
period 2 (t = 2) is revealed. Each ﬁrm adjusts its employment after knowing the realized
z2. If ﬁrms decrease inputs of permanent workers, they incur ﬁring costs. There are no
such costs for temporary workers. Then, production occurs in period 2.
Since period 2 is the ﬁnal period, we assume that ﬁrms need not dismiss employees.
As explained later, in such a situation, ﬁrms never employ temporary workers in period 2;
this feature merely reﬂects our assumption about no dismissals of workers at the end of the
ﬁnal period. Thus, we focus on periods 0 and 1. In particular, omitting ﬁrms’ proﬁts in
period 2, we assume that each ﬁrm determines its products n based on its expected proﬁt
in period 1. Indeed, all important decisions–the number of products, total labor input, and
composition of permanent and temporary workers, are made in periods 0 and 1.
2.3 Production
Labor is the single production input for the homogenous good and the diﬀerentiated goods.
There are two types of workers, who diﬀer in eﬃciency, wages, and ﬁring costs. The ﬁrst
type, permanent workers, holds long-term contracts without predetermined durations. The
5second type, temporary workers, holds ﬁxed-duration contracts. It is assumed that per-
manent workers are more eﬃcient than temporary workers in production of the numeraire
good and the diﬀerentiated goods.3
More speciﬁcally, a unit production of the numeraire good requires either 1/wl units
of permanent workers or 1/ws units of temporary workers where wl > ws. The numeraire
good is perfectly competitive. Assuming that demand for it is always positive, the wage
rates of permanent and temporary workers are wl and ws, respectively. We also assume
that ﬁrms need not incur ﬁring costs for permanent workers in the numeraire good. Thus,
ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between employing permanent and temporary workers.
In the diﬀerentiated goods sector, all varieties of diﬀerentiated goods have a common
linear production technology. Letting y denote the output of a variety of diﬀerentiated
goods, a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm that employs l units of permanent workers and
s units of temporary workers generates y = l + λs where λ < 1 is an eﬃciency parameter.
It is assumed that the eﬃciency gap between permanent and temporary workers is more
pronounced for diﬀerentiated goods than that for the numeraire good. That is, ws/λ > w.
Our model departs from the standard monopolistic competition model by introducing
labor adjustment costs. In particular, ﬁrms must incur ﬁring cost wlγ per worker when
they reduce the employment of permanent workers. By contrast, ﬁrms can freely disband
temporary workers’ ﬁxed-duration contracts at any period, as in the numeraire good sector.
Note that the assumption of ws/λ > w implies that hiring permanent workers would be less
expensive than hiring temporary workers if there were no ﬁring costs.
Each ﬁrm faces a linear demand in Equation (3). Redeﬁning parameters, each ﬁrm’s
revenue can be expressed by r = zy − ay2/2 where a ≡ 2ζ/L. Parameter z determines
the market size for each product and can ﬂuctuate by numerous reasons, including demand
shocks and productivity shocks. The z is i.i.d., and at the end of period 1, ﬁrms draw a
new z from the distribution of g with the cdf of G and determine their employment level
for the second period.
3The employment of permanent workers are more protected than that of temporary workers. Hence,
permanent workers can be more easily motivated to accumulate ﬁrm-speciﬁc skill than temporary workers,
resulting in relative eﬃciency superiority in permanent workers.
62.4 Employment Policy
We ﬁrst consider ﬁrms’ employment policy, given the number of products n. Firms’ em-
ployment policy is based on the dynamic labor-adjustment model in Saint-Paul (1997) and
others.4 Suppose that the market size in period 1 is revealed. The ﬁrm’s expected present










2 − wll2 − wlγ max{l1 − l2,0}
i
, (5)
where E1 represents expectations conditional on information available at t = 1 and we set
the discount rate equal to 1 for simplicity. It should be noted that since period 2 is the ﬁnal
period and the ﬁrm needs not alter employment levels at its end, it never uses temporary
workers in period 2 (recall the assumption of ws/λ > w).
We solve the model from period 2. At the end of period 1, the ﬁrm observes a shock on
z and determines the employment size at t = 2 for maximizing proﬁt. Given the level of







2 − wll2 − wlγ max{l1 − l2,0}. (6)
The ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) of the problem is as follows:
z2 − al2 = wl(1 − γ), if l2 < l1, (7)
z2 − al2 = wl, if l2 > l1. (8)
The case dependency of the FOC is due to the ﬁring cost. When the ﬁrm decreases perma-
nent workers in period 2, it can save wl, but must pay the ﬁring cost wlγ per worker. When
the ﬁrm increases permanent workers in period 2, its marginal cost is simply wl without
future ﬁring. The threshold demand shock zm below which the ﬁrm ﬁres workers is obtained
by setting l2 = l1 in (7):
zm(l1) = al1 + wl(1 − γ). (9)
4The labor market with adjustment costs is extensively studied in the labor economics literature. Exam-
ples of earlier contributions are Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (1994). In particular, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994)
examine labor markets featuring workers with adjustment costs and workers free from adjustment costs. Re-
cent studies based on the framework proposed by these studies include Costain, Jimeno, and Carlos (2010),
Ono, Qinghua, and Jin (2010), Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2008) and Jin, Ono, and Qinghua (2007)
7Likewise, the threshold zM above which the ﬁrm increases workers is given by setting l2 = l1
in (8):
zM(l1) = al1 + wl. (10)
If the shock z is between zm(l1) and zM(l1), the ﬁrm does not alter the number of permanent
workers in period 2:
l2 = l1, if al1 + wl(1 − γ) < z2 < al1 + wl. (11)
The ﬁring cost gives rise to production ineﬃciency stemming from the range between zm
and zM where the ﬁrm does not adjust its employment level at all: that is, its ﬁring cost
is steep even when it does not ﬁre workers in period 2. In addition, it is noteworthy that
the employment level in period 2 depends on the employment level in period 1–i.e., there
exists hysteresis.
We next determine the employment level in period 1. There are two cases. In the
ﬁrst, ﬁrms employ both permanent and temporary workers; in the second, only permanent
workers. We begin with the ﬁrst case. The FOC on temporary workers is simple because
the employment level in period 1 does not aﬀect employment in period 2. The ﬁrm hires
temporary workers up to the point where its marginal revenue equals the wage rate ws:




The ﬁrm determines its employment of permanent workers in period 1, knowing that
permanent workers in period 1 may generate losses in period 2. If the ﬁrm dismisses them in
period 2, it will incur ﬁring cost wlγ per worker. This is the case when z2 < zm(l1). When z2
falls between zm(l1) and zM(l2), the ﬁrm must incur production ineﬃciency wl −(z2 −al1).
Thus, the expected ﬁring cost F(l1) per worker is given by
F(l1) = wlγG(zm(l1)) +
Z zM(l1)
zm(l1)




G(z)dz (Integrating by parts), (13)
which is increasing in l1. That is, as the ﬁrm employs more permanent workers in period
1, it faces a higher expected ﬁring cost in period 2 (see Appendix). Thus, the FOC for
8permanent workers in period 1 is given by
z1 − a(l1 + λs1) = wl + F(l1). (14)
Notice that the right hand side (RHS) of (14) is increasing in l1 while the RHS of (12) is
constant. Since wsλ > wl, the ﬁrm hires permanent workers up to




which pins down the employment level of permanent workers in period 1. Letting ¯ l1 be
the solution of (15), substituting ¯ l1 into the FOC for temporary workers in (12) gives the













The second case is straightforward. Equation (15) indicates that if the market size in
period 1 is small and the necessary employment level is below ¯ l1, then, ﬁrms will employ only
permanent workers because temporary workers are more costly than permanent workers in
such cases. The employment level of permanent workers is determined by the FOC of
z1 − al1 = wl + F(l1). (17)
We express the solution to (17) as a function of z1 such that l∗
1(z1). The threshold market
size z1 is given by setting s1 = 0 and l1 = ¯ l1 in (12):




which implies that when ¯ l1 is high, ¯ z1 is also high.
Figure 3 depicts the determination of the employment level in period 1. It is clear that
the ﬁrm primarily uses permanent workers because as long as the expected ﬁring cost is not
large, permanent workers are eﬀectively less expensive than temporary workers. At point
A, permanent and temporary workers are break even. After point A, the ﬁrm switches to
hiring temporary workers. Total employment level is given by point B when the market size
realized in period 1 is z1 in the ﬁgure. In addition, notice that ¯ l1 is the upper boundary for
9the employment of permanent workers. The corresponding market size is ¯ z1 (not shown).
In the ﬁgure, z0
1 is below ¯ z1. Thus, the ﬁrm hires only permanent workers at the level of l0
1
(point D). This is the second case discussed above.
The beneﬁt of using temporary workers is also clear. Suppose that the ﬁrm cannot
access temporary workers due to, for example, government regulation. In this case, to-
tal employment level is determined by point C. The employment level declines, and the
marginal production cost rises, compared to the case in which temporary workers are avail-
able. Hence, we can observe legitimacy for the Japanese business group’s claim for more
ﬂexibility in the labor market.
We summarize the employment policy in period 1 as follows:
• There exists an upper boundary for the employment of permanent workers. The upper
boundary is implicitly determined by wl + F(¯ l1) = ws/λ. This implies that there is a
threshold market size ¯ z1 above which ﬁrms use temporary workers. Such ¯ z1 is given
as a linearly-increasing function of ¯ l1 such that ¯ z1(¯ l1) = a¯ l1 + ws/λ.
• If z1 > ¯ z1(¯ l1), ﬁrms set the employment of permanent workers at ¯ l1. For ﬂuctuations
of z in the rage of z1 ≥ ¯ z1(¯ l1), the ﬁrm will adjust total employment by altering
employment of temporary workers.
• If z1 ≤ ¯ z1(¯ l1), ﬁrms never hire temporary workers. The total employment of perma-
nent workers is implicitly determined by z1 − al1 = wl + F(l1).
When ﬁrms employ both permanent and temporary workers, the marginal production
cost is simply ws/λ. Therefore, letting µ1, r1, and π1 be the absolute markup, the revenue,





































10where the subscript s indicates that the ﬁrm employs both permanent and temporary
workers. Likewise, when ﬁrms hire only permanent workers, we simply replace ws/λ with























[z1 − (wl + F(l∗
1(z1)))]
2 , (26)
where the subscript l indicates that the ﬁrm employs only permanent workers. Clearly, the
expected ﬁring cost F(l1) declines for all ranges of l1 as γ goes down. Decreases in γ lower
the shadow price of permanent workers,wl + F(l1). However, this change does not aﬀect
ﬁrms’ determination of p,µ,r, and π when ﬁrms employ both permanent and temporary
workers (see Equations (19), (20), (21), and (22)). The upper bound of ¯ l1 rises, and the
ratio of temporary to permanent workers declines as a result. In contrast, when ﬁrms use
only permanent workers, decreases in γ improve proﬁtability: the price declines while the
markup increases. Thus, the revenue and proﬁt go up (see Equations (23), (24), (25), and
(26)). These results are recorded as the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (The impact of ﬁring cost). When the cost of ﬁring permanent workers
increases, ﬁrms do not alter their total employment level if they employ both permanent
and temporary workers. Those ﬁrms simply increase the ratio of temporary to permanent
workers. In contrast, if ﬁrms hire only permanent workers, decreases in the ﬁring costs
directly reduce the marginal cost of production, and ﬁrms can increase their proﬁts.
2.5 Multi-product Firms
We now consider the determination of the number of products in period 0. The expected
ﬁring cost in Equation (13) reveals why even risk-neutral ﬁrms will prefer less volatile sales
revenue: less volatile z2 likely entails a smaller probability of dismissing permanent workers.
11In the extreme, if z is deterministic and constant such that z1 = z2, the expected ﬁring cost
is zero, and there is no demand for temporary workers in period 1. Although we need to
restrict distribution of z within certain classes, we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that z is normally distributed and that zM(l1) is not above the mean
of z. Then, a mean-preserving spread of z decreases the employment level of permanent
workers in period 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma is quite intuitive. Increasing the number of permanent workers in period 1
leads to a rise in ﬁring costs that the ﬁrm may incur in period 2. Thus, if the probability
exceeds 50% that ﬁrms will hire more workers in period 2, a less volatile z encourages
ﬁrms to employ more permanent workers in period 1. Indeed, we can show that z1 >
(zM(l1) + zm(l1))/2 (see Appendix). Thus, if we set z1 at the mean of z, Lemma 1 always
holds. In what follows, we focus on situations in which ﬁrms prefer less volatile z.5
Lemma 1 implies that more stable z leads to a lower expected ﬁring cost for all l1:
∂F(l1,σ)/∂σ > 0. Firms prefer a more stable z because they can produce more eﬃciently
and raise proﬁts when employing only permanent workers (i.e., the realization of z1 is
below ¯ z1). This creates an incentive for ﬁrms to have multiple products for pooling the
sales volatility of products in period 0. Recall that z is i.i.d across all varieties: so if a ﬁrm
has n varieties of the diﬀerentiated goods, the average market size per product is still ¯ z,
but its variance becomes σ2/n. Thus, by Lemma 1, the expected ﬁring cost per worker
decreases as n becomes large. Hereafter, we denote the expected ﬁring cost per worker by
F(l1,n) where ∂F(·)/∂n < 0 and ∂F(·)/∂l1 > 0. It is convenient to state the impact of n
on some variables discussed above in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The upper boundary ¯ l1 rises as the number of products increases. The thresh-
old market size above which ﬁrms start to hire temporary workers, ¯ z1, also rises.
5The condition that zM(l1) does not exceed the mean of z is very strict. It is suﬃcient that the midpoint
between zm and zM is not above the mean of z. In contrast, if this condition does not hold, more volatile
demand tends to lower the expected ﬁring cost because it increases the chance not to ﬁre employees.





Z ¯ z1(¯ l1(n))
wl
πl1(z,n)g(z)dz. (27)
Expected proﬁt per product ˜ π(n) is increasing in n. Although proﬁt per product is invariant
to the number of products when ﬁrms employ both permanent and temporary workers, ﬁrms
hiring only permanent workers can raise their proﬁt per product because they anticipate
lower ﬁring costs (proof is straightforward, but tedious). This reduction of production
ineﬃciency stemming from the ﬁring cost via risk diversiﬁcation is the motivation for ﬁrms
in our model to increase the number of products. It diﬀers from other motivations for
multi-product ﬁrms, such as the issue of core competence and cannibalization (Eckel and
Neary (2010) and Baldwin and Gu (2006)).
It is assumed that multi-product ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost in period 0. This ﬁxed cost is
rendered as a one-time ﬁxed investment for establishing the management cadre. Thus, this
initial investment cost is increasing in the number of products. In addition, we assume that
ﬁrms’ management skills are heterogenous. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁxed cost for management
require f(n;φ) units of the numeraire good, depending on ﬁrms’ management skill φ. The
management skill φ is randomly assigned from a common distribution H(φ) to each ﬁrm
when it enters the market. The level of φ remains unchanged through all periods. We assume
that the management cost satisfy the following three properties. First, unless the number of
products exceeds one, the management cost is zero, f(1;φ) = 0. Second, management cost
is increasing in n for n > 1, ∂f(n;φ)/∂n > 0, and convex, ∂2f(n;φ)/∂n > 0. Third, holding
the number of products constant, the management cost is decreasing in φ, ∂f(n;φ)/∂φ < 0.
The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt per product increases with the number of products. We
simply assume that total management cost nf(n;φ) increases suﬃciently fast such that the
number of products is ﬁnite. We record properties of multi-product ﬁrms in the following
proposition. The scope of products is determined by maximizing total proﬁts, net of ﬁxed
cost for the investment in management. The optimal number of products is given by
˜ π(n,φ) + n
∂˜ π
∂n




13Figure 4 illustrates the determination of n. The marginal management cost curve for a
highly capable ﬁrm (M1) is located below the curve for a less capable ﬁrm (M2). As a
result, ﬁrms with greater managerial ability (n1) have more products than ﬁrms with lesser
managerial ability (n2).
As discussed, ﬁrms hit by the demand shock z1 > ¯ z1 employ both permanent and tem-
porary workers. Their per-product performance measures such as output, product prices,
markup, revenues, and proﬁts, are unaﬀected by the number of products. However, ﬁrms
with more products (large ﬁrms) hire more permanent workers than ﬁrms with fewer prod-
ucts (small ﬁrms). The number of products correlates negatively with the ratio of temporary
workers to permanent workers. Firms hit by the demand shock z1 ≤ ¯ z1 employ only per-
manent workers. In this case, the number of products aﬀects per-product performance
measures. Firms with more products outperform those with fewer products: for any given
z1, ﬁrms with more products have lower product prices, higher markups, higher revenues,
and higher proﬁts per product.
Figure 5 exhibits the determination of the employment level of permanent and temporary
workers per product. In the ﬁgure, ﬁrm 1 with more products hires more permanent workers
(point B) than ﬁrm 2 with fewer products (point A) because ﬁrm 1 has a lower expected
ﬁring cost. However, total employment level per product is the same (point C) because
the two ﬁrms’ marginal production costs are identical. As a result, ﬁrm 1 has a lower
ratio of temporary workers to permanent workers: s1/¯ l1 < s2/¯ l2. The impact of temporary
workers becomes clearer by comparing the case without temporary workers. In such a case,
employment declines and marginal production costs increase at both ﬁrms (point D for ﬁrm
2 and E for ﬁrm 1). In particular, we ﬁnd that using temporary workers is more beneﬁcial
for ﬁrms with fewer products (smaller ﬁrms).
Based on these discussions, the following properties of multi-product ﬁrms are recorded
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. On average, ﬁrms with more products (large ﬁrms) enjoy larger outputs,
lower product prices, greater markups, greater revenues, and greater proﬁts per product than
ﬁrms with fewer products (small ﬁrms).
14Firms with more products (large ﬁrms) hire more permanent workers than ﬁrms with
fewer products (small ﬁrms) per product. As a result, ﬁrms with more products have lower
ratios of temporary workers to permanent workers than ﬁrms with fewer products.
2.6 Open Economy
This section considers the impact of international trade on employment of temporary work-
ers. The framework here is based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We assume two sym-
metric countries, and trade costs between them are the standard iceberg type τ > 1. From
the outset, the two countries are engaged in international trade, and a reduction of τ is
considered to be trade liberalization.
It is also assumed that the homogenous goods are freely traded between the two coun-
tries. Thus, the two countries have the same wage rates for permanent and temporary
workers, and these wage rates are unaﬀected by the reduction of τ. As a consequence, we
can apply the discussions in the previous sections to this open economy.
With the demand function in (3), the threshold price pmax at which demand for a
variety is driven to zero determines the market size and ﬁrms’ entry and exit. Sine the
production technology is linear, we can identify the threshold marginal production cost cd
corresponding to z = pmax. The ﬁrm must exit the market if its marginal cost wl +F(n,φ)
(or ws/λ when it employs both temporary and permanent workers) is above z.
Given iceberg trade cost τ, the threshold marginal production cost cx is given by cx =
cd/τ. In this sense, exporters are more productive, which is now a broadly supported
empirical regularity.6
In addition, it is known that decreases in τ lowers cx (and cd). As a result, less-productive
ﬁrms exit the market and average productivity rises (Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). Such
exits can occur in the current model when ﬁrms use permanent workers only. Although that
seems odd, but it is simply because we assume no heterogeneity in production technology.
As long as ﬁrms employ temporary workers, all ﬁrms can earn the same gross proﬁt per
product. However, once we introduce heterogenous production eﬃciency, it is possible that
6See for example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), Mayer and Ottaviano (2007), and Waka-
sugi, Todo, Sato, Nishioka, Matsuura, Ito, and Tanaka (2008).
15even when ﬁrms use temporary workers, some less-productive ﬁrms exit the market because
of the reduction of trade cost.
In sum, starting with a circumstance where the two countries are engaged in interna-
tional trade, decreases in trade cost reduce the threshold marginal cost (“tougher compe-
tition”). In our speciﬁcation, this is equivalent to the level z dropping permanently. In
Figure 4, this change is represented by a downward shift in the marginal gain from increas-
ing products (the dashed curve). As a result, all ﬁrms decrease the number of products and
raise the expected cots of dismissing permanent workers. Therefore, as a result of lower
trade costs, all ﬁrms lower the upper-boundary for employing permanent workers and rely
more on temporary workers. The ratios of temporary workers to permanent workers rise
for all ﬁrms (including non-exporters).
3 Empirical Evidence
This section explains our data source and presents some empirical ﬁndings related to the
theoretical model in the previous section. The model discussed above yields several empir-
ically testable predictions. Those are as follows:
• Lager ﬁrms tend to have more products and a lower share of temporary workers than
smaller ﬁrms.
• Given that ﬁrms employ both permanent and temporary workers, ﬁrms increase em-
ployment by hiring more temporary workers. When total employment increases, the
share of temporary workers rises.
• When the trade cost τ declines, both cd and cx decline, but cd declines more than
cx. This implies that an increase in the share of export sales among total sales. The
share of temporary workers in total labor input is positively correlated to the share
of export sales.
163.1 Data Source
Our data come from the Census of Manufacturer of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry, one of the representative surveys of economic activity. Originating in 1868,
the census covers all establishments in all manufacturing sectors. It is conducted for all
establishments in calendar years ending in 0, 3, 5 and 8. In other years, it covers establish-
ments with four or more employees. Major items in the census are shipment by products,
inventory, book value of equipment and structures, employment, cost of materials, and en-
ergy usage. Share of exports among total shipments and detailed information about the
composition of employees have been available since 2001.
Since we are interested in relationships among the number of products, volatility of
shipments, and the temporary worker ratio at plant-level, we restrict our sample periods
between 2001 and 2007. We used data for establishments with 30 or more employees because
plants with fewer than 30 employees do not report information on capital stock. Variables of
interest are constructed as follows. The number of products is counted in the ﬁnest product
category available in the data, using 6 digit commodity code. The number of temporary
workers is deﬁned as the sum of part-timers, workers dispatched from other companies
(mainly temporary help services), and temporary employees (day laborers). The volatility
index is the standard deviation of the previous ﬁve-year annual growth rate in shipments
for each plant.
3.2 Data Overview
Employing the above-introduced dataset, this subsection outlines the characteristics of
Japanese manufacturing plants. Table 1 presents the temporary worker ratio by year and
plant size as measured by number of employees. Two items are noteworthy. First, there is
a signiﬁcant negative correlation between plant size and the temporary worker ratio. While
the temporary worker ratio for plants with 1,000 or more employees was 10.6% in 2001, it
was 18.6% for plants with fewer than 100 employees. Second, from 2001 to 2007, larger
plants increased their temporary worker ratio more than smaller plants. For example, while
the increase in temporary worker ratio for plants with 1,000 or more employees was 10.8%
17points, the increase was 4.5% for plants with fewer than 100 employees.
== Table 1 ==
Increases in share of temporary worker show a similar pattern when we examine export
share. Table 2 compares share of temporary workers with the share of exports among
total shipments. Plants with greater than 75% export intensity raised their temporary
worker ratio nearly 10% whereas the increase in the temporary worker ratio was 6% for
non-exporters.
== Table 2 ==
Table 3 shows average number of products by plant size. The average number of products
per plant correlates with plant size. Plants with 1,000 or more employees produce more
than ﬁve products on average; plants with fewer than 100 employees produce around two
products. This result is consistent with Proposition 1. Moreover, large plants tend to
reduce their average number of products. Plants with 1,000 or more employees reduced
their average number of products from 5.85 to 4.97 between 2001 and 2007.
== Table 3 ==
As we discussed, if revenues from each product ﬂuctuate, plants with fewer products
face a large volatility in total revenues. Table 4 presents average volatility of the growth
rate in shipments and shows that small plants face high sales volatility. No clear tendencies
emerge for changes in volatility: perhaps, the trend is vulnerable to macro-economic and
industry-speciﬁc changes.
== Table 4 ==
183.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Estimation Results
To conﬁrm our theoretical hypothesis, we conduct a simple regression analysis. First, we
access whether increases in volatility raise the temporary worker ratio (Temp ratio). The
equation to be estimated is
Temp ratioi,t = β0 + β1V olatilityi,t−1 + νi + µi,t. (29)
Second, we test the eﬀects of reductions in the number of products (N products) on
changes in volatility of shipments. The following simple equation is estimated:
V olatilityi,t = β0 + β1N productsi,t−1 + νi + µi,t. (30)
Third, to investigate eﬀects of competitive pressure on the number of products at each
plant, we examine the exporter dummy (DumExp) and the share of exports among total
shipments (Exp share). Since exporting plants face foreign competition, we expect that
they would reduce the number of products; and the more they ship to foreign markets, the
more products they would reduce. We expect the more they ship their products to foreign
market, the more products they would reduce.
N productsi,t = β0 + β1DumExpi,t−1 + β2Exp sharei,t−1 + νi + µi,t. (31)
We estimate the above three equations with ﬁxed-plant eﬀect and add control variables
such as plant scale measured by number of employees (log(L)) and the capital-labor ratio
(log(K/L)). All equations are estimated with plant-level data in manufacturing. To check
robustness, we compare results for plants that manufacture machinery and equipment with
results from plants that export.
Table 5 presents the estimation result for Equation (29). Column (1) shows the results
for all manufacturing plants. Column (2) and (3) present results for the machinery and
exporting industries. Regardless of sample selection, the main result is qualitatively un-
changed. All coeﬃcients for volatility of shipments are negative and signiﬁcant. That is
consistent with our theoretical prediction.
19== Table 5 ==
Table 6 presents the relationship between number of products and volatility of ship-
ments. Coeﬃcients for the number of products are negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that
volatility of shipments decreases as plants reduce the number of products.
== Table 6 ==
Table 7 presents the estimation result for Equation (31). While the coeﬃcient for the
export dummy is positive and signiﬁcant, that for export share is negative and signiﬁcant.
This result suggests that once plants start to export, they tend to increase their number of
products, but the beneﬁcial eﬀect diminishes as they increase their export share. Column
(4), (5), and (6) add the export share category dummies instead of the export dummy
and export share. Since non-exporting plants are the control group, coeﬃcients for export
share category dummies present the overall inﬂuence of changes in share for each category
of export. Results show that while plants with relatively smaller export share–mainly new
exporters–tend to increase the number of products, plants with more than a 50% export
share are likely to reduce the number of products as export share expands. The positive
impact for new exporters was not expected in our theoretical framework. It may reﬂect the
a beginning exporter learns by exporting and introduces diﬀerent products, but a plant will
trim the number of products because of international competitive pressures.
== Table 7 ==
4 Conclusion
Since the 1990s the number of temporary workers in Japan’s labor market has rapidly in-
creased. This trend has been remarkable in the manufacturing sector, which increasingly
20relies on sales to foreign markets. This paper has formalized the idea that global competition
may encourage ﬁrms to shift their labor demand from permanent to temporary workers. For
this purpose, we developed a theoretical framework involving monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms that employ permanent and temporary workers. In our model, these two types of
workers present diﬀerent adjustment costs if ﬁrms ﬁre them. Because of these adjustment
costs and revenue uncertainty, ﬁrms are incentivized to maintain multiple products to re-
duce revenue ﬂuctuations per product. However, holding many products is costly because
appropriate management becomes diﬃcult. Only ﬁrms with exceptional management skills
can maintain many products.
International trade or more openness intensiﬁes competition (Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008)). As a result, all ﬁrms must reduce their number of products, which raises their
demand for temporary workers who entail no adjustment costs.
The model is empirically tested using micro-date for Japanese manufacturing plants.
We ﬁnd that the model’s predictions are moderately supported.
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23Table 1: Temporary Worker Ratio by Plant Size
Scale 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
30-99 18.6% 19.7% 20.7% 21.7% 22.4% 23.0% 23.1%
100-299 21.3% 23.0% 24.9% 26.0% 26.9% 27.6% 28.3%
300-499 21.2% 23.5% 25.2% 26.6% 27.4% 29.4% 31.0%
500-999 15.8% 19.5% 20.4% 22.3% 23.7% 25.6% 28.3%
1000- 10.6% 11.8% 12.5% 14.7% 15.5% 18.7% 21.3%
24Table 2: Temporary Worker Ratio by Year and Export Share
Scale 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
0% 19.8% 21.3% 22.6% 23.8% 24.5% 25.4% 26.0%
0%<exp≤25% 12.7% 13.9% 15.5% 16.8% 17.7% 18.8% 19.3%
25%<exp≤50% 12.8% 13.1% 14.0% 16.3% 17.5% 18.6% 19.9%
50%<exp≤75% 12.4% 13.7% 14.4% 14.7% 15.6% 16.0% 18.2%
75%<exp 10.5% 10.4% 12.0% 13.8% 13.0% 15.9% 20.1%
25Table 3: Average Number of Products by plant size
Scale 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
30-99 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.03 2.03 2.02 2.18
100-299 2.36 2.37 2.36 2.34 2.32 2.31 2.47
300-499 3.00 3.08 3.03 2.99 2.94 2.89 3.05
500-999 3.51 3.56 3.52 3.53 3.43 3.36 3.40
1000- 5.85 5.92 5.72 5.30 5.32 4.92 4.97
26Table 4: Volatility of Shipments by Plant Size
Scale 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
30-99 0.155 0.158 0.158 0.155 0.154 0.151 0.146
100-299 0.154 0.158 0.157 0.159 0.156 0.150 0.143
300-499 0.150 0.154 0.158 0.156 0.155 0.150 0.145
500-999 0.156 0.158 0.160 0.157 0.158 0.151 0.147
1000- 0.157 0.164 0.163 0.163 0.159 0.155 0.156
27Table 5: Regression analysis: Determinants of Temporary Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing Machinery Exporting industry
Dep. var Temp ratio Temp ratio Temp ratio
Volatility 0.016 0.0137 0.0132
[4.46]*** [2.42]** [2.76]***
log(K/L) -0.0041 -0.0057 -0.0055
[-6.61]*** [-5.18]*** [-6.10]***
log(L) 0.0428 0.0462 0.0416
[28.86]*** [18.91]*** [20.15]***
const 0.0742 0.0318 0.0466
[8.55]*** [2.13]** [3.79]***
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0494 0.0757 0.0692
N 166275 55226 82850
Note: ”***”, ”**” and ”*” show 1%, 5%, 10% statistical signiﬁcance, respec-
tively. Export industry includes chemical products, electric machinery, general
machinery, transportation equipment, precision instruments and non-metallic
mineral products.
28Table 6: Regression analysis: Determinants of Volatility
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing Machinery Exporting industry
Dep. var Volatility Volatility Volatility
N products -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0009
[-2.78]*** [-2.51]** [-2.02]**
log(K/L) 0.0003 0.0006 -0.001
[0.57] [0.68] [-1.32]
log(L) -0.016 -0.016 -0.0193
[-14.03]*** [-7.75]*** [-11.41]***
const 0.2166 0.2459 0.252
[32.40]*** [19.48]*** [25.14]***
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0118 0.0357 0.0237
N 166275 55226 82850
Note: ”***”, ”**” and ”*” show 1%, 5%, 10% statistical signiﬁcance, respec-
tively. Export industry includes chemical products, electric machinery, general
machinery, transportation equipment, precision instruments and non-metallic
mineral products.
29Table 7: Regression Analysis: Determinants of Number of Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing Machinery Exporting industry Manufacturing Machinery Exporting industry
Dep. var N products N products N products N products N products N products
Dum export 0.0736 0.0904 0.0769
[7.37]*** [5.47]*** [6.02]***
exp share -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0022
[-5.30]*** [-4.46]*** [-5.14]***
D(0%<exp share≤25%) 0.0577 0.0675 0.0584
[6.29]*** [4.47]*** [5.00]***
D(25%<exp share≤50%) 0.0397 0.0564 0.0241
[2.46]** [2.36]** [1.26]
D(50%<exp share≤75%) -0.0501 -0.0854 -0.0744
[-2.12]** [-2.50]** [-2.71]***
D(75%<exp share) -0.0731 -0.0772 -0.0693
[-1.92]* [-1.50] [-1.60]
log(K/L) -0.0048 -0.0198 -0.0087 -0.0049 -0.02 -0.0089
[-1.19] [-2.40]** [-1.39] [-1.21] [-2.43]** [-1.42]
log(L) 0.1202 0.1336 0.1392 0.1199 0.1331 0.1387
[12.50]*** [7.27]*** [9.68]*** [12.47]*** [7.25]*** [9.64]***
const 1.884 2.0924 1.9586 1.8851 2.0946 1.961
[33.56]*** [18.67]*** [22.94]*** [33.58]*** [18.69]*** [22.97]***
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0182 0.0083 0.0121 0.0182 0.0083 0.0121
N 166275 55226 82850 166275 55226 82850
Note: ”***”, ”**” and ”*” show 1%, 5%, 10% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively. Export industry includes chemical products, electric
machinery, general machinery, transportation equipment, precision instruments and non-metallic mineral products.
3
0Table 8: Summary Statistics
stats N mean sd p25 p75
Volatility 166275 0.153 0.107 0.076 0.201
No. of products 166275 2.288 1.869 1.000 3.000
r nonreg 166275 0.230 0.232 0.044 0.349
log(K/L) 166275 5.870 1.265 5.249 6.614
log(L) 166275 4.557 0.813 3.951 4.970
Dum export 166275 0.116 0.321 0.000 0.000
exp share 166275 2.088 9.173 0.000 0.000
31Table 9: Correlation matrix
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] Volatility 1
[2] No. of products 0.0227 1
[3] r nonreg -0.0037 -0.0737 1
[4] log(K/L) -0.0259 0.1383 -0.2382 1
[5] log(L) 0.0006 0.243 0.0628 0.1862 1
[6] Dum export 0.0553 0.1445 -0.0967 0.145 0.2648 1
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Figure 5: Changes in the Number of Products
37A Appendix: Technical notes
A.1 Expected Firing Cost
The expected ﬁring cost can be calculated as follows.
F(l1) = wlγG(zm(l1)) +
Z zM(l1)
zm(l1)




G(z)dz (Integrating by parts). (A.1)
Since G(z) is non-decreasing in z and the distance between zM(l1) and zm(l1) is constant
at wlγ and invariant to l1. Thus, F(l1) is increasing in l1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Totally diﬀerentiating Equation (15), we obtain







dσ = 0, (A.2)















G(z)dz > 0. (A.4)
Thus, dl1/dσ < 0.
38